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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we contend that the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is
premature. Developing countries are struggling to adjust to the
heightened standards of intellectual property protection required by
the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. With TRIPS, at least, these countries
obtained side payments (in the form of trade concessions) to offset the
rising costs of knowledge products. A free-standing instrument, such
as the SPLT, would shrink the remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS
Agreement with no side payments and no concessions to the catch-up
strategies of developing countries at different stages of technological
advancement.
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More controversially, we argue that a deep harmonization would
boomerang against even its developed country promoters by creating
more problems than it would solve. There is no vision of a properly
functioning patent system for the developed world that commands
even the appearance of a consensus. The evidence shows, instead, that
the worldwide intellectual property system has entered a brave new
scientific epoch, in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas
about how best to treat a daunting array of new technologies. The
proposals for reconciling the needs of different sectors, such as
information technology and biotechnology, pose hard, unresolved
issues at a time when the costs of litigation are rising at the expense of
profits from innovation. These difficulties are compounded by the
tendency of universities to push patenting up stream, generating new
rights to core methodologies and research tools. As new approaches
to new technologies emerge in different jurisdictions, there is a need to
gather empirical evidence to determine which, if any, of these still
experimental solutions are preferable over time.
Our argument need not foreclose other less intrusive options and
measures surveyed in the Article that can reduce the costs of delaying
harmonization. However, the international community should not
rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual
property. It should wait until economists and policymakers better
understand the dynamics of innovation and the role that patent rights
play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in place to
keep international obligations responsive to developments in science,
technology, and the organization of the creative community.
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INTRODUCTION
Proposals to further harmonize domestic patent laws at the
international level1 have understandably attracted considerable
attention.2 As intellectual property continues to grow as a component
of global trade, the costs of worldwide protection and enforcement
3
have soared. Patent holders accordingly seek ways to acquire and
maintain their exclusive rights more efficiently in an integrated world
marketplace.4 They are also increasingly frustrated by the need to
5
pursue multiple actions for infringement in cross-border disputes.
Under the bedrock principle of territoriality, successive litigations can
trigger different applications of domestic and international patent
norms to the same set of facts and can lead to conflicting judgments
and arguably irreconcilable outcomes.6

1. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. (WIPO), Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents,
Report, at 1–2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of
Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2–3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17, 2004); WIPO, Standing Comm. on
the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2
(Sept. 30, 2003).
2. See generally WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT),
Geneva, Switz., Mar. 1–3, 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum], available at http://www.
wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (hosting the presentation of
papers, lectures, and speeches on the international harmonization of patent law).
3. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. The
European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000); Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be
Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 473 (1996).
4. See infra notes 8–19 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop. (AIPPI), Question Q174—
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in the Case of Cross-border Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights, 2003/I Y.B. 827–28, Oct. 25–28, 2003, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/
resolutions/Q174_E.pdf (recognizing the need for a fairer and more efficient method of
resolving cross-border controversies); European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in
Intellectual Prop., Exclusive Jurisdiction and Cross-Border IP (Patent) Infringement: Suggestions
for Amendment of the Brussels I Regulation, in 29(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 195, 195–96
(2007) (suggesting the need to amend the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EC Regulation No 44/2001, to improve the
efficiency of transnational dispute resolution).
6. See, e.g., David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the
European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 550 (1996) (observing that “the English and
German courts reached opposite conclusions in parallel litigation in the two countries” (citing
Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc., 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838 (1993), [1993] GRUR
Int. 242 (F.R.G.), and Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181
(Eng. Ch. 1989))). On the validity and infringement of the patent protecting Fosamax, see
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
holding that the patent is invalid because it was obvious, and Merck & Co. Inc.’s Patents, [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 1545, [1]–[73] (Eng.), holding that the patent is invalid because it was both
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Governments have responded to the upswing in patent
applications by searching for techniques that would allow them to
7
share examination responsibilities and costs. The Patent Cooperation
8
Treaty and various regional agreements, such as the Convention on
the Grant of European Patents, embody many important procedural
advances.9 These instruments, however, are seldom the product of
true harmonization exercises, in part because the outcome of
examinations conducted within these frameworks is typically a set of
individual national patents that remain separately enforceable under
10
local laws. In 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
obvious and lacked novelty. On the importance of allocating a jurisdiction for a patent dispute,
see generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002),
and Mariano Municoy, Symposium, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models
Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the
Relationship of Private Parties, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342 (2005), and see also Case C593/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, [2007] F.S.R. 5 (E.C.J. 2006) (questioning whether
conflicting national judgments of validity or infringement should be considered
“irreconcilable”).
In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems torn by the
tension between territoriality and the global exercise of patent rights. Compare, e.g., Voda v.
Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “considerations of comity, judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and other exceptional circumstances constitute compelling
reasons to decline [supplemental] jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c)” over foreign
patents), with AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(endorsing de facto extraterritorial application of domestic software patents to conduct
occurring in countries that reject software patents), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
7. Bruce A. Lehman, Addressing the Crisis of the Global Patent System, JAPAN ECON.
CURRENTS, Jan. 2005, at 5, 5–6, available at http://www.keidanren-usa.org/publications/currents/
docs/JEC_Jan05_132K.pdf.
8. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
9. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. In
addition, the European Community (EC) is considering the development of a region-wide
community patent. See John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 341, 343 (2004); Hanns Ullrich, National, European and Community Patent Protection: Time
for Reconsideration 14–22 (European Univ. Inst., Dep’t of Law, EUI Working Papers, LAW
No. 2006/41, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963759.
Other nations are contemplating or have enacted similar measures. See Agreement Revising the
Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property
Organization, tit. I, Feb. 24, 1999, available at http://www.oapi.wipo.net/doc/en/bangui_
agreement.pdf; Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the African
Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), 2, § 1, Dec. 10, 1982, available at
http://www.aripo.org/Documents/Protocols/harare_agreement.pdf (last amended Aug. 13, 2004);
Marcelo J. Vernengo, Kees de Joncheere & Enrique Fefer, Advances in Pharmaceutical Market
Integration in Mercosur and Other Latin American Countries, 32 DRUG INFO. J. 831, 834–35
(1998).
10. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 9. The Agreement
Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual
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11
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS), which
incorporated the 1967 text of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property,12 took a major step toward substantive patent
law harmonization. It established a set of minimum international
13
standards of protection for some 150 participating countries. Yet the
Agreement, which did not attempt to create a uniform or deeply
harmonized global patent regime, left ample room for national
variations and approaches, which are often collectively deemed “the
TRIPS flexibilities.”14
The effort by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) to organize a thorough exploration of the possibilities for
further harmonization is therefore a welcome development to much
of the patent community.15 Under the aegis of WIPO’s Standing
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), the Draft Substantive

Property Organization, supra note 9, however, does grant a regional patent. A draft European
Patent Litigation Agreement is also under consideration. Draft Agreement on the
Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, Feb. 16, 2004, available at http://www.
european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/agreement_draft.pdf.
11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
12. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967); TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 11, art. 2.1.
13. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 27–34.
14. See id., art. 1.1; see also John Sulston, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on
the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization,
Development and Policy Space for Flexibility (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (discussing the TRIPS flexibilities). See
generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE
BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE
BOOK] (providing background and technical information on the TRIPS Agreement); J.H.
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS
Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (C. M. Correa & A. A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
15. See, e.g., Daeshik Jeh, Director, Patent Examination Policy Team, Korean Intellectual
Property Office, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization and Development: The
Experience of the Republic of Korea (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (discussing the benefits and desirability
of harmonization); Kenji Kamata, Japan Intellectual Property Association, Presentation Before
the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): The Rationale
and Benefits of Patent Law Harmonization (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (same).
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16

Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) represents an attempt “to pursue a ‘deep
harmonization’ of both the law and practice” concerning not just the
drafting, filing, and examination of patent applications, but also the
17
cornerstone requirements of patentability. Ideally, member states
would agree to adopt identical rules concerning what constitutes a
novel and useful invention, when a technical advance meets the
requirement for an “inventive step” (nonobviousness), and how much
information must be revealed by the patent disclosure. “Deep
harmonization” would also entail agreement on priority of
inventorship (whether a patent is awarded to the first to invent or the
first to file) and whether inventors will be accorded a grace period
permitting publication for some period prior to filing.18 Notably,
through the efforts of the so-called Group of Friends of
Development,19 this initiative is being tested against the drive for a
more development-friendly agenda at WIPO, with a view to ensuring

16. WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(SPLT), supra note 1.
17. Karen M. Hauda, The Role of the United States in World-Wide Protection of Industrial
Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 89, 97 (Frank Gotzen ed., 2003).
18. Id. (“This approach was adopted in an attempt to avoid the controversial hurdles to
agreement that were found in the past.”); see also Philippe Baechtold, The Future Role of WIPO
in the Area of Industrial Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
GLOBAL MARKET OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 139, 143 (”[T]here are
other issues that require further reflection . . . [including] the question of patentable subject
matter, . . . the requirement of technical character of the invention, the exceptions from
patentability, the introduction of some form of grace period and the issue of equivalents.”).
19. In the Fall of 2004, the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property
Organization invited comment on a proposal presented by the Group of Friends of
Development (led by Argentina and Brazil) for the establishment of a Development Agenda
for WIPO. WIPO, Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a
Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.
int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. Since then, many other
proposals have been presented and discussed. E.g., WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals
Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Report of the Third Session, at 1, PCDA/3/3 (June
11, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_3/pcda_3_3.pdf; WIPO,
Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Proposal for a
Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, PCDA/2/2 (June
23, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_2/pcda_2_2.pdf; see also
James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 9, at 3–4 (2004), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/
2004DLTR0009.pdf (criticizing the “one size fits all” approach of WIPO and the TRIPS
agreement).
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consideration of the needs of all nations, whatever their technological
20
capacities may be.
Despite the promise such an effort holds, we believe that it is
unwise to move to deep substantive harmonization so quickly after
21
the TRIPS Agreement elevated patent standards universally. These
standards challenged the technological catch-up strategies of all the
developing countries and saddled them with social costs they are
struggling to absorb.22 As the endless controversies surrounding
23
pharmaceutical patents demonstrate, higher standards of global
protection—whatever their incentive effects24—also generate severe
and unintended distributional consequences for the developing

20. WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda,
Proposal for a Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda,
supra note 19; WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development
Agenda, Report of the Third Session, supra note 19, at 1.
21. For developing countries, the patent standards (articles 27–34) of the TRIPS
Agreement became generally operational on January 1, 2000. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11,
art. 65.2; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 444 (2000). Developing countries,
however, that did not previously allow product patents on pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products were given another five years to cover them, subject to a “mail-box”
provision for patents arising in the meantime. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts 65.4, 70.8–
70.9 (mailbox and minimum exclusive marketing rights).
22. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 159–62 (2002), available at http://www.
iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR]; CARLOS M.
CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5–44 (2000); Reichman, supra note 14, at 77–92.
23. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access
to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 541 (2007) (discussing Novartis’s effort to patent
Gleevec); Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 544–46 (2007) (noting Merck’s objection to Thailand’s compulsory licensing of an
antiretroviral medication). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The
Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
394, 408–10 (Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (discussing how patents function
as obstacles both to prevent generic products from entering the market and to prevent
competition that may lower costs).
24. See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alphonso Gambardella, Markets for
Technology, Intellectual Property Rights and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 23, at 321, 325–26 (“Strong patent protection provides incentives to codify and
organize new knowledge in ways that are meaningful and useful to others.”); Alan O. Sykes,
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47,
48 (2002) (“The ultimate wisdom of measures that relax intellectual property protection for
pharmaceuticals in developing countries turns on complex matters, including empirical issues
about which one can only hazard an educated guess.”).
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25
world. A further round of harmonization will likely aggravate these
and other unresolved problems without producing any offsetting user
rights or concessions for these countries. On the contrary, the
dynamics of TRIPS and the post-TRIPS trade agreements teach that
even a development-sensitive negotiation process is likely to produce
an instrument that furthers the interests of developed countries at the
expense of poorer, less powerful participants.26
More controversially, we contend that higher levels of
harmonization will harm even the developed countries, including
those that are most aggressively pressing for yet another round of
multilateral intellectual property negotiations. The domestic patent
laws as currently practiced were largely formulated for the inventions
27
of the Industrial Revolution, and these laws still reflect the
technological premises and concepts of the creative sectors as they
were then structured. Yet in this postindustrial information age, with
knowledge-intensive inventions emerging from new kinds of research
institutions, creative entities are organized nonhierarchically and
along continuously changing lines.28 New players, such as universities
and scientific research organizations, routinely patent their output,
and whole new sectors, including biotechnology and information

25. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006) (“Over-reliance on utility maximization ignores
distributional consequences . . . but intellectual property globalization has made these aspects of
the provision of basic knowledge goods increasingly difficult to ignore.”); Peter M. Gerhart,
Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public Goods, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 69, 72 (“[A]lthough institutions like the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
promote an efficient system of global trade and investment, we have found no way to tax those
who benefit from the efficiency of the global system in order to support those who do not.”);
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast.
26. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 73, 73–74 (Peter
K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the tensions between developed and less-developed countries with
respect to the TRIPS Agreement).
27. See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006).
28. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2077–78 (2000); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39–40,
44–46 (Winter/Spring 2003); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrum, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:
Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 133–34
(Winter/Spring 2003).
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29
technology, have emerged. Until the operations of these and other
new technical communities are better understood, there is a greater
need for legal experimentation at the substantive level than for
harmonization. In the absence of any international governance
infrastructure capable of interpreting and amending the law (rather
than freezing it prematurely), a compelling case can be made for
delaying deep harmonization until other methods for improving the
efficiency of a global patent system have been fully explored.30
Part I of this Article surveys the implications of deep
harmonization for developing countries, and Part II does likewise for
developed countries. Part III suggests that the appropriate goal for
the progressive development of world intellectual property law after
TRIPS is to nurture an “incipient transnational system of
31
innovation,” which can, in turn, provide the appropriate template for
validating global patent norms over time.

I. THE LIKELY ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Before moving to the more controversial claim that
harmonization could boomerang against its developed-country
advocates, we stress that even a cursory look at the results of the
TRIPS Agreement reveals the problems harmonization of the type
envisioned by the SPLT pose for the developing world. Although
TRIPS specifically leaves room for nations to tailor their laws to their
internal needs and pace of intellectual advancement,32 experience
shows that emerging economies are, in fact, greatly challenged by the
costs and hardship associated with adjusting their development

29. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property
Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (Winter/Spring 2003).
30. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 23, at 3, 17–20.
31. Id. at 44.
32. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1 (leaving Members “free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice”); id. at arts. 7–8 (stressing objectives of promoting innovation and transfer
of technology “to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge”
and “the public interest in sectors of vital importance to [Members’] socio-economic and
technological development”). See generally UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14
(discussing “flexibilities” within the TRIPS regime).
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strategies to new legal realities and that successive rounds of
negotiations tend to reduce the flexibilities available for nations to
33
tailor intellectual property law to their own needs.
A. The Social Costs of the TRIPS Patent Standards
In principle, higher standards of patent protection under the
TRIPS Agreement will provide needed incentives to invest in the
innovative sectors of some developing economies,34 to make hightechnology products available to local industries, and to promote new
35
licensing agreements and direct foreign investments. In practice,
however, their different national and regional capabilities,
institutions, and endowments limit the developing countries’
absorptive capacities and reduce the potential benefits of open
markets for knowledge goods. This “technology divide” is further
widened by the high rents exacted by technology exporters.36
Whether they fall into the high-, medium-, or low-income
brackets, all the developing countries—except for a small group of
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—that seek to become suppliers
of knowledge goods must compete on roughly the same normative
37
terms and conditions that govern advanced industrialized countries.

33. See, e.g., CIPR, supra note 22, at 8–9, 21–27; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 4–
15; Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 839–42 (2003). For a more optimistic view, see Joseph
Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of Intellectual
Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2006).
34. See Straus, supra note 33, at 4.
35. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 109–42 (2000); Keith E. Maskus, Kamal Saggi & Thitima Puttitanun, Patent Rights
and International Technology Transfer Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 265, 265. But see Daniel C.K. Chow, The
Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in
4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 26, at 187, 187 (stressing
China’s ability to attract foreign direct investment despite weak intellectual property rights).
36. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to
Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 227, 229–32
[hereinafter Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing
Countries?]; Carlos M. Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for Developing
Countries, 21 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 377–79 (1994) [hereinafter Correa, Trends in Technology
Transfer]; see also KEITH E. MASKUS, UNCTAD-ICTSD, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (2004).
37. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.1 (requiring that “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology” if they
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Although some developing countries have demonstrated considerable
38
capacity in certain technological sectors, all are struggling to cope
with the limits TRIPS places on their ability to reverse engineer upto-date foreign technologies that were previously unpatented in their
territories. For example (and especially problematical), the ability to
produce generic drugs without regard to pharmaceutical patents was
39
completely eliminated in 2005. For an economy like that of India,
where the generic drug industry is a significant source of income and
a key locus of technological development, “fair following” by honest
means of reverse engineering had been an important strategic
option.40
Whether they engage in the production of knowledge goods for
local consumption or for export purposes, developing countries must
internalize the TRIPS-mandated intellectual property standards in
ways that stimulate potentially innovative industrial sectors without
41
legally discriminating against foreign competitors. They must also
avoid undermining those less-advanced sectors of their own
economies that meet local needs for knowledge goods at affordable
prices. India’s new patent law, for example, reflects the tensions
between efforts to stimulate the nation’s research-based

meet specified eligibility criteria); id. arts. 65–66. As regards pharmaceutical products in
particular, see World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration]; Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition
Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/IP/C/25 (July 1, 2005).
LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, including the duty to
provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until 2013. See Decision of
the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article
66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WT/IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). During these
transition periods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and Most Favored Nation
(MFN) obligations under articles 3–4 of the TRIPS Agreement. See id. para. 5.
38. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923538 (“India
became a world leader in high-quality generic drug manufacturing.”); Straus, supra note 33, at
6–8.
39. See sources cited supra note 37.
40. See Mueller, supra note 38, at 4, 28, 55. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders
to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
11 (1997) (evaluating “the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on [developing countries’] capacity
to acquire the knowledge and skills they need to compete on the market for technologically
advanced products and processes”).
41. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 3–4.
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pharmaceutical sector and efforts to preserve its well-developed
capacity to supply low-cost drugs for the needy in both domestic and
42
foreign markets.
At the same time, the foreign technology suppliers’ demands for
increased rent extraction—combined with refusals to work, refusals
to deal, and various forms of unchecked anticompetitive conduct—
hamper the efforts of developing-country entrepreneurs to acquire
high-technology goods on open markets at prices that preserve their
own comparative advantages.43 These practices also frustrate their
governments’ ability to attract foreign direct investment and to build
the infrastructure needed to move to a more competitive position on
44
the technological frontier. Although the full extent of these barriers
has been insufficiently studied, it seems that high-tech manufacturers
in developed countries prefer selling to wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries rather than to potential competitors in developing
countries. When sales are made to third parties, the net welfare gains
from technology installation may be offset by the costs of increased
rent extraction.45
Moreover, all the developing countries, even those not engaged
in the production of knowledge goods, must maintain patent offices
and create mechanisms that enable foreign patent owners to enforce
46
their rights—a costly and burdensome operation. How they
accomplish this task will seriously affect their internal development

42.
43.

See Mueller, supra note 23, at 541–43; Mueller, supra note 38, at 55–61.
See John Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN
KNOWLEDGE 57, 61 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) (stressing the difficulties of entry—
”compounded by the international IP system”—into markets “dominated by multinational
oligopolies”); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369–
70 (2002) (discussing differing opinions on local work requirements between developed and
developing countries); cf. Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital
Information Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 23, at 142, 145 (suggesting that similar problems arise in connection with copyrighted
scientific and educational works).
44. See MASKUS, supra note 35, at 119–35; Barton, supra note 43, at 373–74; Correa, Can
the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, supra note 36, at
229–32; Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer, supra note 36, at 371–72.
45. See, e.g., Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 309, 317–20 (finding increased rent
extraction following patent strengthening).
46. CIPR, supra note 22, at 114.
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strategies along with their ability to supply such essential public goods
as education, public health, environmental safety, scientific
advancement, and a soundly competitive marketplace for goods and
47
services.
These tensions are linked with, but not necessarily determined
by, problems of wealth distribution. For example, the TRIPS
Agreement made assumptions about technological self-sufficiency
that proved inaccurate and contributed directly to a health crisis over
48
much of the globe. Although the subsequent Doha Round remedied
the problem by permitting countries to issue compulsory licenses to
meet the health needs of nations unable to produce locally needed
medicines, the Doha Agreement took several years to negotiate and
its efficacy is yet to be demonstrated.49
Admittedly, TRIPS gives its Members some leeway to tailor their
laws to local needs. For example, states can presumably supply their
own definitions of “inventive step” and determine for themselves the
50
technological scope of patent protection. They can refuse to patent
diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic methods;51 they can exclude from

47. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 33–35; cf. Chon, supra note 25, at 28–49
(describing the nation-state as the “best guardian of the domestic welfare bargain” upon which
the international trading system should not unduly intrude); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1090
(2007) (comparing material interests in intellectual creations and protections to human rights
interests, such as health, education and free expression).
48. See Doha Declaration, supra note 37, para. 6; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art.
31(f). The TRIPS Agreement allowed compulsory licensing of patented products in the
domestic market. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31. Members lacking the capacity to
manufacture pharmaceuticals locally, however, could not effectively use compulsory licensing or
obtain exports under a double compulsory licensing regime. Id., art. 31(f); Doha Declaration,
supra note 35, para. 6. For a description of the difficulties in providing access to essential
medicines, see generally Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005).
49. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & JEROME H. REICHMAN, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: LESSONS
LEARNED SINCE THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 13 (2007); Abbott, supra note 48,
at 317 (“Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned about access to medicines were
disappointed by the complexity of the [Doha Declaration’s implementation], arguing that it
would be unworkable in practice.”).
50. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 27(1), 28. Article 27(1) lists an “inventive
step” as one of the requirements for patentable subject matter but does not define the term. Id.
art. 27(1). Article 28 defines scope in terms of the nature of the rights conferred, but the
Agreement does not set out the breadth of technological terrain a patent right must cover. Id.
art. 28.
51. Id. art. 27(3)(a).
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patentability inventions required to protect ordre public, morality,
52
and human health; and they can grant limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred.53 They also have increasing power to order
54
compulsory licenses. These flexibilities allow developing countries
considerable policy space in which to maximize the benefits and
minimize the social costs of adopting the international minimum
standards. But addressing these flexibilities is expensive and requires
a sophisticated legal infrastructure. Taken together with the costs of
complying with the obligations TRIPS mandates, the burden on
developing countries is formidable.55 To make matters worse, these
same countries must increasingly also deal with pressures to provide
the higher, TRIPS-plus levels of intellectual property protection
56
embodied in bilateral or regional trade agreements.
B. Shrinking the TRIPS Flexibilities
Against this background, any form of deep harmonization
through the SPLT that is likely to win the support of the developed
countries seems certain to erode whatever flexibilities the developing
countries still retain under the TRIPS Agreement and under
subsequently negotiated TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreements
(including their Most Favored Nation implications57). Consider, for
example, the eligibility requirement of an inventive step
(nonobviousness).58 The standard of inventiveness is intimately tied to
a nation’s economic goals, and especially to its citizens’ technological

52. Id. art. 27(2).
53. Id. art. 30.
54. See id. art. 31; see also ABBOTT & REICHMAN, supra note 49, at 13 (noting that the
proposed amendment to the TRIPS agreement, already accepted by WTO members on
December 6, 2005, would permit expansion of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical
products).
55. See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 135–214, 358–61
(describing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement); SISULE F. MUSUNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA
& ROXANA BLASETTI, UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION
THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS 23–34 (2004); Reichman, supra note 40, at
28–29.
56. See Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Trade Framework: IP
Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95, 97–98 (2004).
57. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4 (establishing MFN treatment).
58. Id. art. 27.1 (requiring patents to be made available for inventions that are “new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”). Footnote 5 equates the
terms “inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” with “nonobvious” and “useful.”
Id. n.5.
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59
potential and to the types of creativity it can hope to foster. Even
within one nation, determining the right standard can be difficult. In
the United States, for example, the threshold of nonobviousness has
60
varied widely at different periods, and it remains a contentious
61
issue.
Perhaps for these reasons, TRIPS leaves the height of the
inventive step to national law. Presumably, deep harmonization
requires convergence on a single standard. Yet finding one that would
suit countries at different levels of technological sophistication and
62
for all kinds of intellectual advances could easily prove impossible.
Whatever standard is chosen will, at best, represent a mediate
position—one that will differ from the optimum for many developing
countries.
More generally, there is a risk that virtually every procompetitive
option still left open to developing countries under their domestic
patent laws—from exceptions to patentability to limitations on
exclusive rights and the possibility of imposing compulsory
63
licenses —would shrink or disappear in the SPLT. After all, if
experience is any guide, on virtually all of these issues, the advanced
industrialized countries will tend to demand higher protectionist
standards than those favored by policymakers in developing
countries. The United States, for example, has shown little willingness
to limit the scope of patentable subject matter by adopting the
“technical effect” requirement found in other countries’ patent
statutes.64 The United States—indeed developed countries

59. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 300–01 (1997);
see CIPR, supra note 22, at 7.
60. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 35 (2004).
61. See id.; John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 508 (2003); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887 (2004). Indeed, despite more than two-hundred years of
experience with a patent system, the standard of nonobviousness was just the subject of another
Supreme Court case, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). KSR’s effect
on patent issuances remains to be seen, but it appears to have once again raised the standard of
nonobviousness.
62. For example, although the standard in the United States is currently low, see, e.g.,
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 34–35, the standard in India is high, see Mueller, supra note
38, at 86–89.
63. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 351–57.
64. Compare Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 9, arts. 52–53, 57
(requiring patents to be capable of having an “industrial application,” defined by the EPO as
requiring the ability to be used in any kind of industry), and European Patent Office,
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generally—has resisted the inclusion of exceptions to patentability for
health, the environment, or the protection of genetic resources and
65
traditional knowledge. In fact, the United States appears to be
taking the position that any agreement reached must reflect the
66
standards of protection found in U.S. law. Such intransigence does
not bode well for the kind of compromising required to produce an
instrument that truly accommodates diverse needs.
Of course, the TRIPS Agreement adopted some relatively high
standards, and various bilateral and regional free trade agreements
67
impose even higher ones. But in those negotiations, there is, at least
theoretically, the prospect that advanced industrialized countries will
exchange higher intellectual property standards for trade concessions
in other areas which fosters some degree of equity. The rents to be
extracted from a highly protectionist intellectual property regime
would thus be offset (to some extent) by new market access
opportunities. In the context of a free-standing patent agreement,
such as the SPLT, no such compensation is possible. There is little in
the way of offsetting doctrinal concessions that private stakeholders
would permit developed-country negotiators to offer developing
countries in return for adopting a patent regime that the latter regard
as suboptimal. Such a bargaining stalemate, indeed, is precisely what
caused the failure of the Diplomatic Conference to Revise the Paris
Convention in 1985 and led the technology-exporting countries to

Computer-Implemented Inventions, http://www.epo.org/focus/issues/computer-implementedinventions.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (requiring patents for computer-implemented
inventions to make a technical contribution), with State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (requiring only that mathematical inventions
have a “useful, concrete and tangible result”(quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1994))).
65. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
228–34 (2d ed. 2003); cf. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 & n.21
(1980) (noting resistance to the adoption of compulsory licensing provisions in U.S. patent law).
66. See generally Hauda, supra note 17.
67. See, e.g., Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.4.7(e)(i),
May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/finaltext/index.html (prohibiting parallel importation, even though the issue is left open by article 6
of the TRIPS Agreement). See generally Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 80 (2004)
(elaborating “on the bilateralism in [intellectual property rights] standard setting, using as an
example the substantial elevation of [intellectual property rights] standards in the Central
American Free Trade Agreement . . . in relation to pharmaceutical test data . . . and the new
requirement . . . linking patent protection to the registration of a pharmaceutical product”).
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bring intellectual property within the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
68
Trade Negotiations in 1986.
The counterargument is that the benefits of a smoothly working
worldwide patent system will ultimately trickle down to developing
69
countries and help them climb the technological innovation ladder.
Such a system would, in theory, lower transaction costs, produce
greater legal certainty, and permit emerging economies to invest in
building the technological skills of their population, secure in the
knowledge that technology transfer and foreign direct investment will
follow.70
However, the counterargument has many defects. One is that no
one knows the exact contours of a system that would produce these
results, and a good case can be made for quite divergent approaches.
For example, one of us has taken the Indian example to heart and
argued that developing countries would benefit from a patent system
71
that makes it easy to acquire protection. The theory is that such a
regime would encourage innovation at the level at which it can be
realistically elicited, and that the resulting patents would produce
“buy in” in the form of an appreciation for the wealth that intellectual
72
property protection creates. Conversely, the other author has
suggested exactly the opposite: that the need to build competitive
markets mandates that the acquisition of full patent rights should be

68. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986,
MIN(86)/W/19, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/Punta_e.asp; see
also SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 96–120 (2003) (“In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the
world.”). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) (addressing “industrialized countries’ growing concerns over
technology transfer and their efforts to obtain protection of intellectual property rights under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”); Peter K. Yu, Symposium, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004)
(demonstrating “that the international intellectual property regime is an ongoing project that
provides opportunities and crises for both developed and less developed countries, as well as for
rights holders and individual end users”).
69. See Maskus et al., supra note 35, at 265 (noting that developing countries rely on
foreign technology to spark economic growth).
70. John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME, supra note 23, at 617, 622 (proposing ways to limit the costs of a global patent system
for developing countries).
71. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 59, at 300.
72. Id.
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73
made relatively difficult. On this view, governments should rely on
second-tier regimes—such as utility model laws or “compensatory
liability regimes” (liability rules)—to stimulate investment in locally
attainable adaptations or improvements of foreign technology, and in
“cumulative and sequential innovation” generally.74 In the absence of
empirical evidence either way, experimentation makes more sense
than freezing the law prematurely.
Trumping all of these substantive and strategic considerations,
moreover, is the fact that what developing countries most need is a
period of calm and stability in which to devise intellectual property
strategies consistent with both the TRIPS Agreement and the needs
of their own emerging national and regional systems of innovation.
This is a lengthy and arduous task in its own right. It is difficult for
governments and civil society to interact in devising innovation
policies that will maximize the use of local assets, minimize the social
costs of high international minimum standards of intellectual property
protection, and preserve an optimal supply of public goods that are as
essential to long-term development prospects as legal incentives to
75
Developing countries cannot succeed if, at the
innovate.
international level, a new round of multilateral intellectual property
negotiations threatens to raise the technological ladder once again,
before these countries even get a solid foothold on it.76

II. THE LIKELY ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
However cogent the concerns of developing countries might be,
one must nonetheless weigh them against the supposed benefits of
deep harmonization.77 If lower transaction costs, increased legal
certainty, and greater economies of scale and scope prove as
remunerative as the advocates of harmonization contend, one could

73. Reichman, supra note 40, at 31.
74. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 3, 39–41; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy
Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application
to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at
337, 340–42 (arguing that a liability rule which promotes small-scale innovation in the
developing world would stimulate investment by local entrepreneurs).
75. Margaret Chon, for example, highlights the problem of providing school children with
affordable textbooks. Chon, supra note 25, at 2894–95.
76. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 37–39.
77. See Baechtold, supra note 18, at 142–43. See generally Hauda, supra note 17; Jeh, supra
note 15.
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envision a compromise scheme that achieves these ends on behalf of
developed economies, but permits developing countries to reject such
changes if, on balance, they are not as helpful to them as pursuing a
slower track. Developing countries could be further placated with
78
79
selected concessions and compensatory side payments.
The sad truth, however, is that no one has managed to put
forward a vision of a properly functioning patent system for the
developed world that commands even the appearance of a consensus.
There are as many different proposals on the table as there are
thinkers and investigators. With its relatively experienced patent
office, excellent trial courts, specialized appellate court, and a
Supreme Court poised to add a generalist perspective, the United
States uniquely possesses the kind of institutional infrastructure
80
needed to build and maintain a strong patent law system. Even so,
all that the proponents for change in that country can agree on is that
the patent law badly needs reform. The risk and cost of litigation is
rising rapidly, which creates a drag on innovation and imposes
81
disincentives to invest in creative production. Two studies by the
82
National Academies
and another by the Federal Trade

78. Concessions might include greater harmonization of international patent law with the
Convention on Biological Diversity, with imposition of certificates of origin and prior consent
for inventions making use of developing country resources and with some recognition of
traditional knowledge in international intellectual property law. See Thomas Cottier & Marion
Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property
Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 372, 376 (2004); Graham Dutfield, Legal and Economic
Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at
495, 505–06.
79. Robert O. Keohane, Comment: Norms, Institutions, and Cooperation, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 65, 67.
80. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
81. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript at 14, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (suggesting that the costs of litigation are beginning to overtake the
monetary rewards of the patent system, at least in certain technological sectors); Michael J.
Meurer & James Bessen, The Patent Litigation Explosion 1 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n 15th Annual
Meeting, Working Paper No. 57, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art57; Scott
Stern & Fiona Murray, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific
Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 9–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701.
82. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC
RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006)
(considering the effects of patenting and licensing practices in the fields of genomics and

02__REICHMAN_DREYFUSS.DOC

104

11/1/2007 3:15:45 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:85

83
Commission, and criticism from numerous legal and economics
84
scholars and a variety of judges85 have offered various diagnoses of
the problems and assorted, often contradictory, prescriptions for
change. Indeed, even the goals of the patent system are the subject of
debate: although patents may still protect inventors from free riders,
scholars have suggested that in many new industries, patents serve
86
signaling, financing, and allocating functions, which arguably could
be performed in ways that have fewer adverse effects on the public
interest.87

protemics and steps that the NIH can take to promote productivity and innovation); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) (offering seven
criteria for evaluating the present patent system and seven recommendations for designing a
more effective patent system).
83. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending policies for maintaining the proper balance between
patent law and competition law and policy).
84. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 35 (contending that patents are now
available “to pretty much anyone who ask[s] for one, despite the legal tests or novelty and nonobviousness,” arguing that the trend “now undermines rather than fosters the crucial process of
innovation”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1559, 1578 (2006) (“[A] strong argument can be made that the observed problems are
not caused merely by the implementation of the law, but also by its articulation: by an
institutional failure to keep patent law and policy abreast with developments at the
technological frontier.”); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 24 nn.85–88 (citing critical
articles by Professors Rai, Kesan, Merges, Lemley, Heller & Eisenberg, Barton and others);
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 615 (1999)
(proposing “common-sense starting points to deal with the problem of business concept
patents”). In reality, Professors Jaffe and Lerner are more optimistic than they sound, because
they think the problems stem from how the patent law is applied and not from what it provides.
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 5–6.
85. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority’s position on utility standards); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 358 F.3d 916, 919–30 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (considering and rejecting Rochester’s position on
the written description requirement); Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860,
863–64 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with the dissent’s position on the scope of infringement
liability), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
86. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemary Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 102 (2001) (examining the “‘patent paradox’ in the semiconductor industry, where the gap
between the relative ineffectiveness of patents . . . and their widespread use is particularly
striking”); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (“The ability to
convey information credibly to observers at low cost is a highly valuable role of patents that has
been completely overlooked.”); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005) (analyzing the role patents play in fostering investments).
87. For example, Dirk Czarnitzki and his coauthors demonstrate a positive correlation
between patenting rate and publication rate, which suggests that publications could serve as
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In Europe, similar uncertainty exists. In a publication entitled
88
89
Scenarios for the Future, the European Patent Office (EPO) has
frankly recognized the uncertain future of the worldwide patent
system. It has outlined four different scenarios that could emerge in
response to different interest groups seeking to influence domestic
and international policymaking forums.
The first scenario envisions the tightening of worldwide patent
standards under an international treaty, such as the SPLT, a position
championed by many multinational corporations.90 A second scenario
envisions the evolution of a variegated system in which developing
countries—especially emerging economies—gradually reshape the
91
existing patent system to suit their own comparative advantages. A
third scenario envisions a shift toward second-tier regimes, possibly
sounding in liability rules rather than exclusive rights, which would
specifically address the problems posed by cumulative and sequential
innovation.92 The fourth scenario envisions a re-elaboration of the
signals of technological competence. Dirk Czarnitzki, Wolfgang Glänzel & Katrin Hussinger,
An Empirical Assessment of Co-Activity Among German Professors 17 (ZEW Ctr. for
European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 06-080, 2006), available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/
pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06080.pdf. Eric Brousseau and coauthors have investigated the use of
contracts to govern relationships among innovators in the high-tech sector. Eric Brousseau,
Régis Coeurderoy & Camille Chaserant, The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on
Technology Licensing Agreements, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 205
(2007). Paul David’s work looks at the role of publication rates in allocating research resources
in science. Paul A. David, Positive Feedbacks and Research Productivity in Science: Reopening
Another Black Box, in ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGY 65, 69–70 (O. Granstrand ed., 1994).
88. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (EPO), SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE—HOW MIGHT IP
REGIMES EVOLVE BY 2025? WHAT GLOBAL LEGITIMACY MIGHT SUCH REGIMES HAVE?
(2007) [hereinafter SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE].
89. The EPO is not an organ of the European Communities. Rather, it was established by
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC). Id. at inside cover. The EPO, which
acts as a regional patent office for the member states, is the executive body of the treaty
members. There is also an administrative council, which operates as a de facto legislative body.
Revisions of the EPC are undertaken by an intergovernmental diplomatic conference for the
contracting states. Id.
90. See id. at 30–47. With “[b]usiness as the dominant driver,” this scenario tells “[t]he story
of consolidation in the face of a system that has been so successful that it is collapsing under its
own weight; Power and Global Jungle are the major driving forces.” Id. at 29.
91. See id. at 48–65. With “[g]eopolitics as dominant driver,” this scenario tells “the story of
conflict in the face of changing geopolitical balances and competing ambitions, where Power
and Global Jungle are the major driving forces, but in contrast to the business-led scenario, the
states are the key players.” Id. at 29.
92. See id. at 95–96. With “[t]echnology as dominant driver,” this scenario tells “[t]he story
of differentiation in the face of global systemic crises, where Pace of Change, Systemic Risks
and Knowledge Paradox (as the nature of knowledge changes) are the major driving forces.” Id.
at 29; see also J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
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basic patent paradigm that would give much greater weight to the
provision of public goods and “access to knowledge” in general, at the
93
expense of private incentives to innovate. Although the EPO takes
no position on which of these scenarios it favors, its publication
demonstrates that policymakers responsible for the future evolution
of the patent system will be constrained to take account of the
divergent interests underlying each of these remarkably prescient
scenarios.
It should, indeed, surprise no one that routine tinkering with a
patent paradigm launched in Venice in the fifteenth century and
refined by the United Kingdom in the seventeenth century cannot
answer the hard questions raised by new technologies and the new
94
modes of producing them. There are major challenges for which past
experiences give only untested and untrustworthy hypotheses, with
no convincing empirical studies on the horizon to resolve the doubts.
These problems affect all aspects of patent protection. Not only are
there discordant views on how high the inventive step should be,
there are also disagreements on virtually every substantive topic
under discussion in connection with the SPLT: novelty and utility
standards, the research exemption, compulsory licenses—along with
standards for analyzing infringement and awarding relief.95

Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 23, 24 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu] (proposing a “compensatory
liability regime” for incremental innovation); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent
and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2447 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal
Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms] (suggesting that a liability regime would
increase investment in cumulative and sequential technologies while avoiding market failure
with fewer anticompetitive effects).
93. See SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 88, at 72. With “[s]ociety as the dominant
driver,” this scenario tells, “[t]he story of erosion [of patent law] in the face of diminishing
societal trust, where Power (from the bottom up) and societal fear of Pace of Change and
Systemic Risks—and Knowledge Paradox (in terms of access and control)—are the major
driving forces.” Id. at 29; see also Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Movement, 117
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (describing the development of groups opposing restrictive rights
and promoting greater public access).
94. See MAY & SELL, supra note 27, at 203–18 (“Only by understanding the long history of
intellectual property can the problems of its contemporary global governance be properly
assessed.”). See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (discussing the diversity of patent law and the potential costs
of harmonization).
95. See, e.g., Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the
Substantive Requirements of Patent Law, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,409–11 (Mar. 19, 2001) (listing
seventeen differences between U.S. patent law and the law of other developed countries); see
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Furthermore, there are a multitude of open procedural
questions—including questions about the level of scrutiny that patent
96
offices give to applications, the standards for reexamining issued
patents, as well as the availability of avenues to challenge patents
97
administratively (through opposition procedures) and judicially
(through, for instance, declaratory judgment actions).98 The National
Academies’ Report criticized the reluctance of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit to defer to the examination guidelines that the
U.S. Patent Office applies to new technologies, while applying
unrealistic standards of its own that ignore what those skilled in the
art actually know.99 Others have questioned vesting powers over
patent law in a single specialized court, pointing to the Federal
100
Circuit’s penchant for de novo review, its apparent lack of interest
101
in economics or patent policy, and its insulation from criticism.102

also James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44, 44 (describing the
proliferation of patent infringement claims in e-commerce).
96. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1495–96 (2001).
97. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 181, 192 (discussing opposition procedures and
standards of proof).
98. For U.S. examples, see the various proposals for patent reform, including the Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); the Patent Reform Act of 2005,
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), which proposed opposition procedures, including varying
standards of proof on the question of validity; and the ruling in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 775–76 (2007), in favor of standing to challenge patent validity in a
declaratory judgment action. Cf. Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516 (2003) (advocating instant disclosure of all patent applications via
the Internet).
99. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 82, at 87–95.
100. See, e.g., Samantha A. Jameson, Note, The Problems of the Utility Analysis in Fisher
and its Associated Policy Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE L.J. 311, 311 (2006) (questioning
whether the PTO is equipped to deal with policy and criticizing the decision in Fisher).
101. Cf. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e observe that the
government and its amici express concern that allowing EST patents without proof of utility
would discourage research, delay scientific discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’
and ‘Science.’ . . . [These] are public policy considerations which are more appropriately
directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government, rather than this court as a judicial
body responsible simply for interpreting and applying statutory law.”). See generally Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 769 (2004) (surveying the effects of “specializing the adjudication of patent disputes by
channeling patent appeals to a single court”).
102. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 84, at 1567–70; Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over FactFinding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 913 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1035, 1035 (2003); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
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This Article cannot explore all of the problems with which the
system is grappling. Our purpose is to demonstrate how promulgating
substantive law in the absence of either a normative consensus or an
authority competent (in both the cognitive and juridic sense) to
administer and revise it will interfere with the emergence of new
industries, with scientific advancement, and with the development of
new approaches to encouraging and supporting innovation.
A. Emerging Industries
Although there is broad dissatisfaction with domestic patent
systems, many of the complaints—at least in the United States—are
based on law developed for emerging sectors, principally information
technology and biotechnology.103 These issues merit a deeper look.
1. Information Technology (IT). With regard to the IT sector,
there is considerable debate about the need for exclusive rights to
promote development of software and business methods and whether
patent protection is the appropriate regime to use. Unlike copyrights
and contractual rights, patents create claims that are good even
against independent inventors. For cumulative technologies or in
instances where interoperability is an important goal, the need to sift
through prior patents and negotiate rights arguably creates a high tax
on innovation and a drag on development.104
Other untoward consequences may flow from the decision to
permit patenting in this area. For example, the risk of debilitating
suits motivates participants to acquire multiple patents, hoping that
with enough potential counterclaims, they can fend off or negotiate
their way out of difficulty. The result is a vicious cycle: thickets of
rights that are expensive (or nearly impossible) to clear, requiring an
ever-larger arsenal of defensive protection.105 Furthermore, many IT
products involve multiple inventions and, accordingly, multiple

Principle 5 (George Washington Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 225), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928498.
103. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155–56 (2002).
104. See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308,
2422 (1994). Many of these problems were identified well before patents on software were
issued. Id. at 2361.
105. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 59.

02__REICHMAN_DREYFUSS.DOC

2007]

PATENT LAW HARMONIZATION

11/1/2007 3:15:45 PM

109

106
licenses. In that environment, holdout possibilities are numerous
and, as the Blackberry case107 nearly demonstrated, can potentially
undermine the investments of producers, other patentees, and the
108
public. All of this patenting activity fosters so many potential
lawsuits that, as economists James Bessen and Michael Meurer have
concluded, the cost of litigation has begun to exceed the profits from
109
patents by all measures in this sector.
In addition, some IT products are characterized by strong
network effects and standard setting, which may make switching costs
110
high and lock consumers into inferior products. Those holding
patent rights in products toward which a market has tipped receive
awards out of proportion to the technical contributions of the
inventors. When these patents also dominate their fields, they allow
right holders to prevent entry by competitors.111
Commentators further criticize the way the law has been
administered. To some, the European approach, which looks for a
technical effect, is superior because it greatly limits the kinds of
information technology that can be protected.112 Others note that,
because courts assume the level of skill in the art to be high, they
relieve patentees of the obligation to disclose the underlying code.

106. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 86, at 109–10 (discussing semiconductors).
107. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 1, 5 (2005).
109. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 81 (manuscript at 13, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(noting that “annual worldwide profits from software patents are only $0.69 billion, far less than
litigation costs”).
110. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 124 (2006).
111. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the Intellectual
Property/Competition Law Interface, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 119, 121–23
(2005) (noting that the dominance factor exists especially in fields such as biotechnology); Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119 (2001) (“In several key industries, including
semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet, our patent system is
creating a patent thicket: an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to
commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.”).
112. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 278–79 (2000) (advocating an approach that asks
whether “a patent incentive is actually required to promote investment in innovation”); John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1179–84 (1999) (stating
that “the European Patent Convention presents the most fulsome articulation of the industrial
applicability standard”).
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These patents can be very broad and, because they fail to enable, they
deprive the public of disclosure, which is one of the significant
113
Moreover, because monetary
benefits of the patent system.
damages are calculated based on the value of the product and not of
the patent that has been infringed, this sector attracts “trolls,” who
are in the business of making money though litigation rather than
114
through product development.
2. Biotechnology. The burgeoning field of biotechnology is
experiencing a different set of problems. Here, courts and the PTO
consider the level of skill quite low,115 which leads to narrow patents
and the danger of an “anticommons effect.”116 When that occurs,
property rights cannot be aggregated efficiently to create, for
example, effective methods for assembling and screening new
molecules or to realize the ambitions of personalized medicine, which
would require whole-genome sequencing.
Because U.S. courts tend to conceptualize DNA as molecules
117
rather than information products, manufacturers and researchers
can easily evade patent rights in some cases by—essentially—
paraphrasing the information covered by the patent.118 As a result, the
patent may yield insufficient incentives to support research in a given
119
area. Paradoxically, there is also a growing number of patents in this
113. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring a “written description of the . . . manner and
process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same” (emphasis added)); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1689 (2003).
114. See Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 307 (2006); cf. Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong., § 5(a)(2) (2007) (proposing a change in damages
calculation based upon “the patent’s specific contribution”).
115. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (refusing to find the subject of
a patent “obvious” despite the fact the “the claimed molecules, their functions, and their general
chemical nature may have been obvious from” prior research); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he combination of prior art references does not render the claimed
invention obvious . . . .”).
116. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998).
117. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999).
118. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of
Structural Biology, Genomics, & Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 876 (2006) (noting
that manufacturers could alter “protected nucleotide sequences” while generating a functionally
similar product).
119. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 113, at 1676–80.
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field—particularly patents on genes and certain proteins that are, at
120
least for research purposes, so broad that it is unlikely a patent
holder could efficiently exploit the entire breadth of the claims.
Meanwhile, the potential blocking effects appear increasingly serious.
3. Reconciling the Needs of Different Sectors. It is not clear that
these problems will be easy to resolve. First, these quick sketches of
two emerging sectors demonstrate that there is disagreement
concerning the existence, scope, and nature of the problem. For
example, despite the strong and persistent complaints about patents
in the software industry, there is some empirical evidence that the
patent system is not hurting—and may be helping—the development
of this sector.121 Patent reform is thus stalling at least in part because
domestic stakeholders cannot even agree that reform will be worth
the dislocations it will entail.
Second, there are disputes about how to handle the problems.
For example, some economists claim that reengineering the law is not
necessary. They argue that the system could be restored to order by
simply improving the quality of the patents that issue (that is, by
creating a mechanism for ensuring that patents issue only for
inventions that are truly nonobvious).122
Third, it is proving so difficult to find common ground among the
various patent industries that some have suggested sector-specific
123
legislation. If heeded, this approach could take patent law down
untested pathways culminating in a set of clumsy, sui generis
124
regimes. Moreover, even if such an approach proved politically

120. See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human
Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005) (suggesting that sometimes a single gene can be
associated with as many as twenty patents); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents
and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 711–12 & n.19 (2004); see also Andrew Chin, Artful
Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975, 977 (2006) (describing the
shortcomings of the U.S. Patent Office registry approach in documenting prior art of genetic
research, thus leading to “low-quality patents . . . issued on inventions that are already known or
represent only an obvious advance in the field”).
121. Mann, supra note 86, at 985–1012; Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the
Software Industry (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=926204).
122. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 197–207.
123. Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1202 (suggesting that industry-specific tailoring is
“desirable”).
124. Cf. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, supra note
92, at 2445 (examining “proliferating legal hybrids . . . [that] represent both a consequence of . . .
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feasible in a domestic setting, it could elicit objections sounding in the
TRIPS Agreement, which requires that “patents . . . be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of
125
technology.” But TRIPS is only a minimum standard regime. Were
the United States bound by an instrument that required complete
substantive harmonization, resolving the issues that exist within
emerging industries would not be feasible without endless rounds of
entangling negotiations—and, if the system includes enforceable
obligations, unsettling appeals.126
Moreover, the technology sectors are hardly the end of the line:
science is sure to generate new and equally daunting innovation
opportunities in the future. Synthetic biology represents one such
development.127 Because it utilizes both software and biotechnological
advances, this field potentially suffers from the combined impact of

growing incoherence and a cause of the incipient breakdown that is weakening the international
intellectual property system from within”).
125. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27(1); see also Panel Report, Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (distinguishing between
permissible reconcilable “differentiation” attributable to needs of different product sectors and
impermissible “discrimination”). But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 450 (2007) (arguing that “[d]iscrimination is not the
same as differential treatment” and suggesting that some types of differentiating should
withstand challenge).
126. The TRIPS dispute resolution experience is not an entirely happy one in this respect
because WTO Settlement Panels have been ill equipped to deal with technical legal issues. See,
e.g., Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 413 (identifying “interpretive approaches” to the
TRIPS Agreement and raising “questions regarding the level of formalism” of the WTO dispute
settlement process); Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement: Of Sovereign Interests, Private
Rights and Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at
817, 829 (examining “the tension between sovereign/government interests, private rights, and
public goods” in the WTO dispute settlement process); Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public
Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at
884, 884 (focusing on disputes related to pharmaceutical patents and concerns about public
goods including “the generation of new knowledge, the provision of public health, and the
maintenance of rules fostering trade and competition”).
127. Synthetic biology is an engineering field that utilizes artificially constructed DNA to
construct/program useful “machines” (such as plants that produce fuel). See generally Philip
Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624 (2004) (describing synthetic biology and concerns
about risks associated with the field).
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128
Were the SPLT to be
patenting problems in both sectors.
implemented, its adherents would have diminished capacity to adapt
the legal order so that such new opportunities could flourish.

B. Scientific Advancement
The prospects for the future could become even more troubling.
As patenting moves upstream to cover fundamental advances,
existing dysfunctionalities within the system could impede scientific
progress and reduce the chances of generating future opportunities
for innovation. Drawing once again on the situation in the United
States as an example, a reorganization underway within the scientific
community has begun to pose hard and unresolved problems for
patent law.
A major development was, undoubtedly, the wholesale entry of
universities into the patent system. Since the passage of the Bayh129
Dole Act in 1980, which permits universities to patent the fruits of
federally funded research, filings by the university sector have
130
significantly increased. Although the statute aimed mainly to
encourage technology transfer, universities increasingly understand it
as a funding mechanism, with many untoward consequences for
science and education. Most obviously, work that once would have
gone into the public domain for general and free use becomes
privatized.131

128. See Arti K. Rai & Sapna Kumar, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2007) (“The manner in which the law has handled software on the one
hand and biotechnology on the other may not bode well for synthetic biology.”).
129. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000)).
130. The issue of cause and effect is itself a subject of dispute. Some claim that the BayhDole Act created the university patenting phenomenon, whereas others contend that
universities’ desire to patent gave rise to the Act. See Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting
and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,
30 RES. POL’Y 99, 100 (2001).
131. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1998)
(“Only in exceptional circumstances does the statute acknowledge that there may be an
affirmative case for putting a discovery in the public domain for the greater good.”); Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 303 (discussing how increased patent opportunities may reduce the
chance that technology will end up in the public domain); see also J.H. Reichman & Paul F.
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 342–43
(Winter/Spring 2003) (discussing the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on university research and
the public domain).
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Moreover, because academia engages in fundamental research,
university patenting tends to push upstream, which creates broad
rights over core methodologies and research tools—rights that can
132
Although there is some
dominate diverse research agendas.
empirical evidence indicating that universities have begun to patent
more selectively and license these opportunities more wisely,133 horror
stories abound in which universities reportedly signed over rights
without any guarantee that their licensees would bring products to
market. Indeed, sometimes universities appear to have licensed rights
134
to institutions that had private reasons to stifle research and access.
Perhaps to counter this problem, the courts have begun to deploy
various patent law theories to narrow the ambit of broad claims.135
But overly narrow rights in “slivers of innovation” create problems of
their own.136
Even if the universities’ behavior were to improve, problems
with their patenting practices could persist. Courts have decided that
because universities are behaving as commercial actors, patent law
should treat them as such. Accordingly, courts do not afford academic
researchers special privileges to delay work on patentable subject
matter, even when the delay arises from attempts to preserve

132. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research
Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, supra note
92, at 223, 225 (“[T]here seems to be a widely-shared perception that negotiations over the
transfer of proprietary research tools present a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in
biomedical research and product development.”). See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching
Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT at
209 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing reach-through strategies, remedies, and mechanisms).
133. See David C. Mowery, Bhaven N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Learning to Patent:
Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents after the
Bayh-Dole Act, 1981–1992, 48 MGMT. SCI. 73, 85–86 (2002).
134. See Avital Bar-Shalom & Robert Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation in Cancer
Therapeutics: Lessons from CellPro, 80 MILBANK Q. 637, 661 (2002); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena,
The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1417–27
(2007).
135. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(finding that the University’s patent was invalid for lack of an adequate description and stating
that the Bayh-Dole Act “was not intended to relax the statutory requirements for patentability”
for universities).
136. J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132, at 289, 297; see also supra text accompanying
note 116.
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137

pedagogic opportunities for students. This creates one of a series of
new conflicts between a university’s educational mission and its
commercial goals; between a faculty member’s research and teaching
commitments; and between the academy’s duties as honest brokers in
science policy debates and its proprietary self-interest.
Far more worrisome is the judicial trend to deny academics
engaged in scholarly inquiry any further research exemptions from
138
infringement liability. Fortunately, few infringement suits have been
filed against universities to date, but if such cases were to proliferate
unchecked, the cost of basic science would soar. Even in the absence
of suits against scientists, an empirical study has uncovered evidence
that university research is beginning to suffer from an anticommons
effect.139 Although some studies also claim that patents have little
direct impact on university work, scholarship has documented the
erosion of the Mertonian norms, with increased secrecy and a
growing reluctance to share research materials.140 Furthermore,
patenting could easily come to affect scholarly agendas, shifting
attention from the basic work that opens whole new fields of
knowledge to applied research aimed narrowly at exploiting
particular commercial markets. Again, the empirical evidence is
mixed, but the effects of an increasing interest in patenting (and
commerce) on the part of university faculty is alarming.141

137. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding no excuse for
a university professor-inventor’s inactivity when he claimed that his delay was due in part to the
fact that he was waiting for a particular graduate student to begin work).
138. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[O]ur precedent
does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications. For example, major research universities, such
as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no commercial application
whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these
projects. These projects also serve, for example, to increase the status of the institution and lure
lucrative research grants, students and faculty.”).
139. Stern & Murray, supra note 81, at 5.
140. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006); Wesley M. Cohen &
John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNOVATION POL’Y &
ECON. (Adam B. Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & Scott Stern eds., forthcoming 2007); Wesley M. Cohen,
John P. Walsh & Charlene Cho, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309
SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005). For an introduction to Mertonian norms, see ROBERT K. MERTON,
The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
141. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Determinants of Faculty
Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities?, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 599, 601
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In theory, of course, legislation might remedy some of these
problems. For example, Congress could enact a codified research
142
exemption. Patent applications from academics could be examined
differently, and the scope of patents could be adjusted to deal with
the anticommons effect. When necessary, compulsory licenses to
unblock dependent patents and enable improvers to reach the market
could also be enacted, a solution that remains fully consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement.143
Yet, as Section A showed, there is substantial disagreement
concerning the very existence of the problems and the wisdom of
144
proposed legislative solutions. Were the laws in question subject to
substantive international obligations, it would compound these
problems. Some economies may rely on the spillover benefits of basic
research; others may see commercializing university work as an
important source of funding. Another complicating factor is that
universities do not participate equally in all commercial sectors.
Consequently, arguments about technological neutrality would arise

(2007) (suggesting that mid-career faculty, faculty associated with patent holders, and faculty
employed by institutions holding many patents are more likely to patent); Mario Calderini,
Chiara Fanzoni & Andrea Vezzulli, If Star Scientists Do Not Patent: The Effect of Productivity,
Basicness and Impact on the Decision to Patent in the Academic World, 36 RES. POL’Y 303, 317
(2007) (suggesting that scientists engaged in applied research are more likely to patent than
scientists engaged in basic research); Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post Bayh-Dole
Rise of Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 15 (2001) (arguing that the
rising number of patents suggests trouble down the road); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C.
Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT.
SCI. 90, 102 (2002) (showing that research agendas are not changing significantly, but instead
universities are patenting discoveries that they would previously have made publicly available).
142. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the
Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 463 (2004) (calling for a
broad, statutory experimental use exception).
143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31(l); JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH
CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE
PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA 1–2 (June 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/
ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf.
144. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic
Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132,
at 153, 168, 168 (suggesting the current system of genomic patent filings is preferable to
alternatives), with Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material:
A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132, at 196, 195–96 (examining the assumptions
underlying arguments for and against legislative stability); see also Reichman, supra note 136, at
289 (contesting Epstein’s “all or nothing” premise and proposing greater reliance on liability
rules).
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in any attempt to alter the patent system to protect core scientific
progress.
C. New Approaches
When faced with the problems of new technologies and new
players, countries have adopted very different strategies. In
particular, the U.S. approach differs significantly from developments
in Europe. With regard to patents in biotechnology, for example, the
145
EPO, following the European Directive on Biotechnology, seems to
be breaking away from the “chemical compound” analogy that
typifies U.S. law. Instead, it has begun to treat DNA patents as
information products, whose eligibility tests should turn on the
quality and industrial applicability of the information revealed.146
The EC Biotechnology Directive also added a new compulsory
license to facilitate interaction between infringing plant breeders and
147
biotech patents. When implementing the Biotechnology Directive,
moreover, a number of European governments have embarked on
new directions of their own at the expense of a uniform law.
Although some nations were initially unwilling to fully implement the
148
Biotechnology Directive, others, such as Germany, have attempted
to limit gene patents to the use or purpose recited in the application.149
The EPO also seems to have handled the information technology
sector more cautiously than the United States by insisting on a
demonstrable “technical contribution” palpably beyond the state of

145. Council Directive 98/44, Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L
213) 13 (EC).
146. See Rob J. Aerts, The Industrial Applicability and Utility Requirements for the Patenting
of Genomic Inventions: A Comparison between European and US Law, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 349, 351–52 (2004); Samantha A. Jameson, A Comparison of the Patentability and Patent
Scope of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States and the European Union, 35 AIPLA
Q.J. 193, 217–24 (2007).
147. See Council Directive 98/44, supra note 145, art. 12.
148. The recalcitrant EU Member States all implemented the Directive by the end of 2006.
See STATE OF PLAY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC (2007), http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/indprop/docs/invent/state-of-play_en.pdf (last visited Oct.
4, 2007).
149. German Patent Statute, PatG § 1a(4). The provision is controversial. See, e.g.,
Christoph Ann, Patents on Human Gene Sequences in Germany: On Bad Lawmaking and Ways
to Deal With It, 7 GERMAN L. J. 279, 280, available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/
pdf/Vol07/pdf_Vol_07_No_03.pdf.
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150

the art. How the EPO proceeds in this area following the European
Parliament’s rejection of a proposed Community Directive on the
Patenting of Software deserves careful scrutiny.151 Furthermore, even
if patents on software were eventually to produce the kind of
blocking effects experienced in the United States, many European
countries formally recognize the possibility of compulsory licenses for
152
dependent patents on improvements. Although these provisions are
seldom invoked, they likely exert in terrorem effects that stimulate
efficient licensing practices, and they provide patent authorities with a
codified antiblocking measure when needed.
Moreover, the patent system is not the only mechanism for
encouraging technological progress. A strong argument can be made
for supplementing patents with new kinds of intermediate or secondtier protection systems that are more attuned to present-day
technological realities. Although robust property-like regimes, such
as patent law, presuppose clear boundaries between different rights
holders, the actual boundaries between products of the new
technologies are often ill-defined. The problem of cumulative
innovation is thus aggravated by the ways in which new contributions
are dependent on, and intermingled with, earlier innovations. Patents
increasingly breed high litigation and transaction costs because they
artificially divide that which is inherently indivisible, a practice that
needlessly slows the rate of innovation by chilling the ability of
second comers to build on earlier contributions for both scientific and
commercial purposes.153

150. Thomas Hoeren, The European Union Commission and Recent Trends in European
Information Law, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2003); E. Panagiotidou, The
Patentability of Computer Programs, according to the Commission’s New Proposal for a
Directive and to EPO Boards of Appeal Decisions, 9 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 126,
129 (2003); Wolfgang Tauchert, Patent Protection for Computer Programs—Current Status and
New Developments, 31 IIC 812, 818 (2000).
151. See, e.g., Andreas Grosche, Software Patents—Boon or Bane for Europe?, 14 INT’L J.L.
& INFO. TECH. 257, 259–60 (2006) (providing analysis of a wide scope of patent laws and
policies beyond the proposed provisions before the European Parliament).
152. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48A(1)(b)(i) (Eng.); 2 J.W. Baxter, World Patent
Law and Practice § 8.02 (2001); see also Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 104 (1994)
(“[S]tatutes [that] provide, in varying ways, for a liability rule in the case of an improvement
invention that infringes on a dominant patent . . . have no discernable effect on the incentives
for European firms to invent.”); REICHMAN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 143, at 12
(discussing the presence of blocking patents on improvements to prior inventions in many
countries).
153. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu, supra note 92, at 23, 26–29.
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In sectors where these conditions prevail, a different kind of
regime may be superior. To give one example, compensatory liability
regimes—liability rules—may be a good solution for cumulative
technologies. They would protect first comers against wholesale
duplication while enabling improvers to build on their work, subject
to an obligation to return a healthy share of the potential gains to the
154
earlier innovator. These entitlements could be voluntarily adopted
by industrial sectors or mandated by law or regulation to resolve
blocking effects.155 Other ideas—open source models, collaborative
modes of production, clearinghouse models—have also attracted
156
growing attention, although their dependence on exclusive property
rights is often overlooked.157
Of course, not all the advocates of deep harmonization claim to
know all the answers; rather, some suggest codifying basic aspects of
domestic patent law—so-called “best practices”—that would provide
a solid foundation for transnational harmonization.158 But this
approach is premised on several fallacies. First, even for countries at
similar levels of technological sophistication, “best practices” are not
likely to be the same. Moreover, what any given country views as
“best practices” in patent law may reflect other practices in other
laws—including copyright, trade secret, utility model laws, and, above
all, competition laws—that may vary widely from one country to
another.159 The advocates of a “best practices” approach to
154. See, e.g., id., at 48–52; Reichman & Lewis, supra note 74, at 337, 348–65.
155. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
supra note 92 (showing breakdown of trade secret law under present-day conditions and
advocating use of liability rules not premised on secrecy to deal with market failures affecting
incremental innovation).
156. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 463–66, 471–73 (2006); Ian Ayres & J.M.
Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE
L.J. 703, 706–07 (1996); Janet Hope, Open Source Biotechnology (Dec. 23, 2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, The Australian National University), available at http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~janeth/
OpenSourceBiotechnology27July2005.pdf; Geertui Van Overwalle et al., Models for Facilitating
Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions, 7 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 143 (2006)Esther van
Zimmeren et al., A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: The Solution to Ensure Access to and
Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 352, 353–56 (2006).
157. See Boyle, supra note 28, at 67–69.
158. See Hauda, supra note 17, at 97.
159. See Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 177–99
(1999) (critiquing the harmonization of second tier patent regimes); Jonathan Zuck, President,
Ass’n for Competitive Tech., Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n (Feb. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.amc.gov/public_studies_fr28902/international_pdf/060207_ACT_Intl.pdf
(noting the importance of consistent treatment of small businesses in the information
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harmonization do not explain how to identify which practices are
genuinely the best, or explain how international lawmakers will keep
the practices they choose responsive to changing needs.
Another more subtle effect of premature legal harmonization is
that it could unhelpfully homogenize creative development. The
diverging approaches observed in national innovation laws may not
solely depend on differing perceptions of how to cure the same set of
problems. Some of these differences may emerge from differing
problems, differences that arise because each society values its own
specific kinds of creativity and prioritizes its technological
requirements in its own way. The TRIPS Agreement still leaves
countries some room to exclude developments from patentability on
grounds such as public policy and lack of inventiveness, or because
the work is not considered within a field of “technology” and
therefore not within the subject matter of patent law.160 As a result, a
country that excels in certain kinds of work has some flexibility to put
the tools for accomplishing that work into the public domain; other
countries skilled in producing the tools may prefer to make them
patentable.161

technology sector). The debate outlined in the text accompanying this footnote suggests that, at
a minimum, the level of intellectual property protection in any given country may depend on
whether that country has enacted and implemented antitrust law to deal with competitive
excesses. Yet, the SPLT (like TRIPS) does not mandate protection outside the intellectual
property field, and antitrust law is only one of the many related issues that might influence the
appropriate level of protection. See Josef Drexl, The Critical Role of Competition Law in
Preserving Public Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 709, 716–24; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect
the Global Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 23, at 758, 758–69; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 33–41; Hanns Ullrich,
Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 726, 737, 752.
160. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.
161. For example, the United States and Canada have taken divergent positions on whether
higher-order life forms can be patented, leading to different treatment of mice bred as research
tools in the life sciences. Compare Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm’r of Patents), File 28155,
2002 S.C.C. 76 (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc76/
2002scc76.html (holding the oncomouse unpatentable), with Transgenic Non-Human Mammals,
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988), available at,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (search for “4,736,866” in “Field1: Patent
Number”), and Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 445 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (holding certain living organisms
patentable).

02__REICHMAN_DREYFUSS.DOC

2007]

PATENT LAW HARMONIZATION

11/1/2007 3:15:45 PM

121

Because the information necessary to match particular
approaches to specific types of innovation opportunities is lacking,
allowing nations to experiment would be highly beneficial. Some will
use legislative solutions; the Supreme Court’s foray into patent law
162
suggests that the U.S. approach may be judicially based; and in
some places, voluntary schemes will emerge. Over time, experts can
compare and evaluate these experiments, and when one or another
solution appears to yield positive results, nations can emulate that
approach. Harmonization would, in that event, be achieved
voluntarily and on the basis of actual empirical data and experience,
not simply backroom wrangling and special-interest lobbying.163
Allowing nations to shape their laws also gives rise to
comparative advantages by enabling each nation to foster what its
technological community does best. So long as trade remains
relatively free, the flexibility to experiment enhances social welfare
worldwide. Accommodations between national and regional systems
of innovation can then evolve over time on the basis of bottom-up
preferences. Without an agreed-upon legitimate governance process
(through administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures), it is
difficult to see how these kinds of continual accommodations can
occur. A politically skewed re-regulation of the world market,

162. Between the summer of 2005 and the summer of 2007, the Supreme Court considered
seven patent cases. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007);
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curiam)
(dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126
S. Ct. 1837 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Merck KGaA
v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
163. To be sure, special-interest politics will play out in domestic arenas as well. But in the
international context, the problems are particularly severe: well-heeled groups may be better at
attracting international attention, and differences in the ways in which international and
domestic instruments are reviewed tend to systematically unravel carefully negotiated deals in a
direction that favors right holders. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS
and the Dynamics of International Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95, 119–21
(2004). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2004) (“In
the case of intellectual property rights, developing countries and their allies are shifting
negotiations to international regimes whose institutions, actors, and subject matter mandates
are more closely aligned with these countries’ interests . . . challenging established legal
prescriptions and generating new principles, norms, and rules of intellectual property
protection . . . .”).
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coupled with excessive privatization of global public goods, could
164
instead make both competition and innovation more difficult.
To put this another way, patent law’s raison d’être is to
encourage the production of novelty and inventiveness. Its success
means that there will always be new problems to solve. It makes little
sense to preclude the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of
Justice, and their equivalents elsewhere, along with national agencies
and legislatures—all of which have shown themselves capable of
creating law responsive to new circumstances—from offering their
contributions to the evolution of the future patent system.
III. NURTURING AN INCIPIENT TRANSNATIONAL
SYSTEM OF INNOVATION
Of course, if trade is relatively free and creativity flourishes,
some international coordination of the patent system becomes a
necessity. But instead of premature substantive harmonization, what
an integrated world economy needs is a method for lowering the costs
that discrepancies in national laws impose on international actors and
a system that will gradually enable innovators in all countries to reach
the world market by means that are geared to their different national
and regional capabilities and endowments.165 The trick, then, is to
decide which laws actually need some modest degree of
harmonization and to find a mechanism for revising the law as new
coordination problems crop up.
New measures are urgently needed at the prosecution stage. The
priority rules of the Paris Convention, coupled with the Patent
166
Cooperation Treaty and other procedural advances, move the

164. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 19 (suggesting that a “knowledge cartel”
pushes “governments to regulate the global market in ways that lock in temporary competitive
advantages without necessarily advancing the global public interest in innovation, competition,
or the provision of complementary public goods” and reasoning that “representatives of the
global public interest are unlikely to be seated at the table where hard-law negotiations take
place”).
165. See id. at 33 (“All countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational
system of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest in the
production and distribution of knowledge goods.”); see also KEITH E. MASKUS, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REFORMING U.S. PATENT POLICY: GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT 8,
38 (2006) (“The needs of innovation will be better served by a more flexible—and better
enforced—global regime than by the harmonization agenda being pushed by U.S. trade
negotiators.”).
166. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 12, art. 4; see
supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
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system in a direction that makes serial applications easier to
accomplish. Nonetheless, modest harmonization of the standards of
patentability could dramatically lower private costs and make work
167
sharing among national patent offices feasible. It is not, however,
necessary to rely on top-down negotiation at WIPO; beneficial moves
toward a more unified approach could be made even in the face of a
168
moratorium on new international lawmaking. After all, when the
advantages of a particular rule become evident, nations often tend to
voluntarily conform their law to that rule. For example, with the
exception of the United States, every country has acquiesced in
awarding priority on a first-to-file basis;169 the United States is
considering the absolute novelty standard in use elsewhere;170 and
there is discussion (and some action) outside the United States to
introduce a grace period similar to that found in American law.171
Cooperation at the level of government agencies and courts can
172
achieve significant moves toward coordination. These mechanisms
are well known in international law generally and are taking hold in
transnational patent law as well. For example, the European,
Japanese, and U.S. patent offices regularly hold trilateral meetings to
discuss sets of representative cases and to identify differences in
examination practice. When law permits, the offices iron out their
differences, so that they can examine applications using the same

167. See John G. Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and
Enforcement of International Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 958, 963
(2006) (“This article revisits the long known problem of the doctrine of territoriality” and
“proposes an alternative transnational model using as a basis the de facto regional approach of
Europe.”).
168. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 36–39 (calling for such a moratorium).
169. Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive
Requirements of Patent Law, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,410 (Mar. 19, 2001).
170. For an example of proposed legislation that would move the United States to first-tofile and an absolute novelty standard, see supra note 98.
171. See Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 610–
11 (1994) (describing limited grace periods available in Japanese, Australian, and Canadian
law); Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-To-Invent Principle From a
Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions,
39 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626–29, 663 (2002); see also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
172. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 42–43 (1974); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global
Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1041, 1043 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 191, 191 (2003). See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992)
(compiling works discussing governance on a worldwide scale).
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173
standards. Further coordination is achieved through examiner
exchange programs174 and regular judicial forums at which patent-law
judges can discuss common challenges that arise in their respective
175
national jurisdictions.
Many post-grant issues could benefit from comprehensive
international attention. For example, because patentees operate on a
global scale, costly infringement suits on parallel patents have become
176
common. Although different results remain technically possible (in
177
that national patents are independent of one another ), inconsistent
outcomes (in that different parties win in different locations) can
complicate global marketing efforts. Some of these transnational
cases have tempted courts to give extraterritorial effect to their own
laws, a practice that can lead to multiple liabilities for the same harm
and damage claims for acts that were legal in the territory where they
were performed.178

173. See, e.g., Japan Patent Office, http://www.jpo.go.jp/index.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007)
(showing examples of cooperative efforts by Japan and partner countries).
174. See, e.g., The Website of the Trilateral Co-operation, Projects, Use of Work Results,
Exchange of Examiners, and Comparative Studies, http://www.trilateral.net/projects/use_of_
work_results (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
175. See, e.g., Invitation to the Fourth International Judges Conference on Intellectual
Property Law, Intellectual Prop. Owners Educ. Found., available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Past_Meetings_and_Events&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Con
tentFileID=6462 (announcing the schedule of conference events).
176. See John R. Thomas, Litigation beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative
Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 291 (1996);
see also Mills, supra note 167, at 989–96 (discussing a variety of disputes involving parallel
patents). See generally European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Prop.,
supra note 5, at 196–97, 202 (proposing amendments to Regulation EC 44/2001 to ensure
efficient enforcement of parallel intellectual property rights); sources cited supra note 6.
177. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 12, art. 4bis(1).
178. The Federal Circuit was particularly drawn to this tactic. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1367–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (applying
U.S. patent law to the transfer of software onto foreign-assembled computers from “golden
master” disks or electronic transmissions originating in the United States); Eolas Techs. Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1938–41 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (same). The Supreme Court has
presumably ended this practice by reversing the AT&T case. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1759.
Cf. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet
Providers, File 29286, 2004 S.C.C. 45 (June 30, 2004), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/
en/2004/2004scc45/2004scc45.html (noting that the decision to find jurisdiction over an Internet
service provider “raises the spectre of imposition of copyright duties on a single
telecommunication in both the State of transmission and the State of reception,” and also noting
that “as with other fields of overlapping liability . . . the answer lies in the making of
international or bilateral agreements”).
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Globalization has also created new opportunities for sharp
practices. Examples include harassment of lawful users with
179
successive suits and so-called “torpedo actions” that prevent the
180
patentee from obtaining timely relief. In addition, because patents
are territorial, infringers can spread their activities across several
states and leave the patent holder with no single place where a court
181
can find the patent to have been infringed.
Once again, top-down solutions are not necessarily the right
approach. Another less radical response would permit parties in
transnational cases to consolidate all their claims before a single
tribunal or to coordinate multiple lawsuits through cooperation
among the courts in which actions are pending. This would reduce
costs, conserve court resources, reduce opportunities for harassment,
and hopefully mitigate the extraterritorial impulse. Furthermore, as
Professor Graeme Dinwoodie has suggested, courts hearing
multijurisdictional cases may be positioned to find middle ground
among disparate rules—that is, to further harmonization efforts
182
through common-law adjudication. Although adjudicators have
proved reluctant to forge new procedural approaches on their own,183
several organizations are in the process of proposing guidelines and
procedures that courts (or national governments) could adopt. Some
apply to transnational litigation generally;184 others to intellectual

179. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1997)
(successive suits for infringing trade secrets brought in the United States and France not barred
by res judicata).
180. Paul A. Coletti, No Relief in Sight: Difficulties in Obtaining Judgments in Europe Using
EPO Issued Patents, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 351, 367 & n.89 (1999); Robin
Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in the Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 507, 511 (1999).
181. Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 117, 120–21
(2005); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope
of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 281–82 (2007).
182. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 542–43 (2000).
183. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting attempt to
consolidate U.S. and foreign patent claims); Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH
& Co KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] F.S.R. 45 (E.C.J. 2006)
(refusing to permit a German court to determine the consequences of allegedly patentinfringing activity in France when the case required the determination of the validity of the
French patent); cf. Case C-593/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, Goldenberg, [2007] F.S.R. 5
(E.C.J. 2006) (refusing to permit a Dutch court to join foreign defendants to a patent
infringement suit involving a resident defendant).
184. See, e.g., F. K. Juenger, The ILA Principles on Provisional and Protective Measures, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 941, 941 (1997); Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], International Civil and Commercial
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185
property cases specifically. If one of these projects were to succeed,
the experience generated would provide future advocates of
harmonized patent law with data of extraordinary value.
Even when a more centralized approach becomes propitious,
questions will remain about the level at which harmonization should
take place. Thus, the European Community has long been debating
the merits of instituting a Community Patent and other regions are
considering similar projects.186 The United States, Europe, Japan, and
other industrialized countries have discussed the possibility of
187
creating a “limited package” instrument. These initiatives differ
from the SPLT negotiations in a significant way. Because they involve
nations that are similar economically and technologically, there is no
need to compromise on rules that are, in fact, optimum for no one. If
such arrangements were to move forward, broader harmonization
might eventually trickle down, as nations reaching the technological
frontier decided to voluntarily join an existing regime.
Finally, there are advantages to giving the system established
188
The
under the TRIPS Agreement more time to evolve.

Litigation, ILA Res. No. 1/2000 (July 25–29, 2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Civil%
20&%20Commercial%20Litigation/RESlitigation.pdf; Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30,
1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf; Hague Conf. on Private Int’l
Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, available at http://pub.bna.com/
eclr/hagueconvention063005.pdf.
185. AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, approved May 14, 2007
(forthcoming 2008); Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1065–66. The Max Planck Institute is
also working on an International Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments.
Annette Kur, Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for International Regulation—The MaxPlanck Project on International Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 951
(2005); see also Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop. [AIPPI], supra note 5, at 827
(resolving that “courts of a given country should be allowed to make a ruling over infringing
acts regarding certain intellectual property rights, which have taken place in any other
country”); Yoav Oestreicher, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Intellectual Property
Judgments: Analysis and Guidelines for a New International Convention 10 (2004)
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Duke University School of Law), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=939093 (proposing a minimalist international intellectual property convention to solve
the world community’s continuing inability to regulate the field). The European Union has also
had a European Patent Litigation Agreement under consideration. Draft Agreement on the
Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, supra note 10.
186. See supra note 9.
187. Industrialized Countries to Seek Deal on Global Patent Treaty Outside WIPO, 72 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1788, at 606 (Oct. 6, 2006).
188. The Council for TRIPS bears responsibility for monitoring TRIPS implementation
issues. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 68. There are also nongovernmental
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international intellectual property community would learn a great
deal from examining how well emerging economies adapt to the
minimum standards TRIPS sets out, from scrutinizing the decisions of
189
the WTO’s dispute-settlement apparatus, and from observing how
WTO Members cope with TRIPS mistakes, such as the one solved in
the Doha round.190
As drafted, TRIPS has some of the features that a responsive
harmonized law needs. It has a dispute resolution system that could
be used to keep the law current and, as the Doha Ministerial
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health demonstrated, a quasilegislative body able to make larger corrections.191 It is worth waiting
to see how well these existing mechanisms deal with the problems
challenging the international patent community.
As it stands, however, the TRIPS Agreement is not a final
answer to the problem of harmonizing global patent law. The regime
lacks a solid legislative basis for adjusting intellectual property law to
changing needs. Despite precatory statements about the need for
192
balance, the Agreement focuses solely on the producer end of the
equation and does not establish user rights. Thus, it includes no way
for the parties to strike, at the international level, the balance
between proprietary and access interests that good patent law

organizations that follow international intellectual property policy making. See, e.g., Intellectual
Property Watch, http://ip-watch.org/index.php?res=1024&print=0 (last visited Oct. 4, 2007);
Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF), Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines,
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); Knowledge Ecology
International (KEI), http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
(last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
189. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22,
Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1126 (1994).
190. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also MASKUS, supra note 165, at 7
(recommending “a formal complaint at the WTO that specific countries have failed to meet
their enforcement obligations under TRIPS.”); Marianne Levin & Annette Kur, Special Session
at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and
Research in Intellectual Property: Towards More Balanced, User-Friendly Paradigms in IP
Law: A Project Reform of TRIPS (Sept. 5, 2006) (spearheading a proposal to amend the TRIPS
Agreement).
191. See, e.g., Doha Declaration, supra note 37 (mandating further negotiations). See
generally GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN
LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000); Abbott, supra note 48
(commenting on the implementation of the Doha Declaration).
192. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 7; see id., pmbl. & art. 8(1).
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193
requires. Although dispute resolution panels have hinted that their
charge includes making normative assessments of the legitimate
expectations of patentees—a procedure that could, in theory, develop
a series of user rights—these panels have looked no further than a
narrow reading of existing rules protecting user interests.194 They
articulate nothing like the normative vision required of a dynamic
system, capable of responding to new situations.
Arguably, a properly functioning patent law also requires
competition law safeguards. The TRIPS Agreement permits
Members to control anticompetitive abuse, but it does not mandate
195
such control. If WIPO intends to proceed with the SPLT, it would
do well to consider what sorts of user safeguards are needed, to
determine whether it is viable to separate the regime that creates
exclusive rights from the regime that controls monopolies, and to
develop experience and consensus regarding the delicate intersection

193. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New
Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 214 (2006)
(advocating the inclusion of “substantive maxima” in the TRIPS Agreement to provide balance
to the international intellectual property system). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004) (“The TRIPS
Agreement . . . is structured to directly protect the rights of intellectual property holders . . .
[but] does little . . . to explicitly safeguard the interests of those who seek to use protected
works.”).
194. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra
note 125, ¶ 7.56 (finding an exemption permitting the testing of patented pharmaceuticals for
regulatory review purposes to be normatively appropriate (without stockpiling) but only
because many members already had experimental use exceptions in their patent laws);
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 435 (“WTO panels tend to hew closely to text when
resolving disputes.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel
Decision and the “Three Step Test” for Copyright Exemptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 49 (2001) (arguing that the United States–Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, WTR/DS/160/R (WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 2000) case sought only to
“anticipate what the empirical situation [would] be, [rather] than [provide] an explanation of
what the right holder’s markets should cover”).
195. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31(k); see id. art. 8(2); Mark D. Janis, “Minimal”
Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 23, at 774, 776–78; Ullrich, supra note 159, at 731–35.
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196
between these two bodies of law, with due regard to the needs of
countries at different levels of development.197

CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that any efforts to achieve deep
harmonization of world patent law at the present time, such as those
contemplated by the SPLT, are both premature and
counterproductive. The evidence shows, instead, that the worldwide
intellectual property system has entered a brave new scientific epoch,
in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas about how best
to treat a daunting array of emerging new technologies. The existing
system has become increasingly dysfunctional because it operates
with a set of rudimentary working hypotheses that have not kept pace
with technical change. As different countries put these hypotheses to
the test, the focus of international lawmakers—whether at WIPO, the
WTO, or in a trilateral coalition—should be on gaining experience
and data from living within the parameters set out by the TRIPS
Agreement during a prolonged period of open-minded
experimentation.
If international policymakers rise above sectarian interests and
power politics to concentrate on nurturing the incipient transnational
system of innovation that the TRIPS Agreement brought into being,
they can stimulate research and innovation on a grander scale than
ever before. But they must take the time and invest the effort to get it
right. Locking in the fleeting, competitive advantages of one group of
stakeholders or another at the expense of real innovators and
dynamic entrepreneurs everywhere is a bad strategy that will
compromise the world’s aggregate innovative capacity in the long run.
Instead of moving forward with harmonization for its own sake, the

196. GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: THE
INNOVATION NEXUS 99–115 (2007); see Emanuella Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the
Crossroad between Monopolization and Abuse of a Dominant Position: American and European
Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 477–94 (2006).
197. See Drexl, supra note 159, at 709, 720 (“[R]elevant product markets usually have a
limited geographical scope. Whereas intangible goods protected by IPRs may be exploited
worldwide, the geographical market for products based on such IPRs is not necessarily a global
one. . . . For instance, in poorer countries that are net importers of agricultural goods, small
farmers will not compete with farmers on foreign markets.”); Ullrich, supra note 159, at 40
(“Community and national protection must be seen as complimentary parts of an overall system
of protection, where unification and harmonization allow to balance uniformity with specificity
and stability with flexibility of protection.”).
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international intellectual property community must first identify and
test trustworthy, empirically supportable solutions likely to benefit
humanity at large.

